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To the reader
Finland is a relatively safe country. Key contributors to the safety of Finnish society include strong social cohesion, and trust in 
institutions and other people. Thanks to its strong social cohesion, Finland has been a harmonious country. People living in 
Finland have had a sense of belonging, working not only for their personal benefi t, but also for the common good. This may 
be part of the reason why Finland has been placed among the world’s top countries in various welfare comparisons.
Social change has been rapid in the last few decades. Urbanisation has continued and the population has become more diverse. 
Generation gaps have become wider, and increased immigration has signifi cantly changed the face of larger cities in particular. 
For some of the population, globalisation has created signifi cant new opportunities, while others may feel left on the sidelines 
in this fast-changing society. Citizens feel that social diff erences have become greater. The Government has therefore set itself 
the goal of narrowing the income, welfare and health gaps. Polarisation within a society can form a basis for extremist ideas. 
International examples show that extremist thinking can also lead to violent acts against society and other individuals.
Violence and terrorism justifi ed by extremist ideologies or ideas are not new phenomena. Throughout history, there have been 
individuals, groups or states that have tried to infl uence politics or society through the threat or use of violence. For decades, 
the threat of terrorism has been a part of everyday life in many European countries. In Finland, the threat of violence posed 
by extremism has been minimal. However, Finland has not been entirely untouched by this phenomenon. There have been 
two school attacks in Finland, in which the off enders and motives were very diff erent from homicides in general.
In the last twenty years, globalisation and the development of communication technology have meant that, for better or worse, 
Finland has become more closely entwined in the international community. Violent extremism is an international phenomenon. 
Preventive programmes similar to the one under discussion have already been prepared in many Member States of the European 
Union. Preventing and combating violent extremism is a European-Union-wide challenge; responsibility for preventive action 
lies with each Member State.
The objective of this Action Plan is to prevent violent extremism at the earliest possible stage, before it leads to acts of violence. 
Eff ective prevention requires extensive cooperation between the authorities and civic society. Prevention is important for the 
sake of individuals and the whole of society. Participating in the activities of extremist groups that commit violent acts, or 
promoting these ideologies through violence may, in the life of an individual, lead to a situation where returning to a normal 
life proves diffi  cult, if not impossible. A situation where individuals and institutions live in fear is dangerous in terms of society’s 
overall development. This could lead to the use of social resources for security purposes rather than enhancing society’s 
well-being and competitiveness.
Success in preventing violent extremism is important both to society at large and to each individual member of society. 
This Action Plan provides a solid basis for cooperation between various authorities and representatives of civic society in 
the prevention of violent extremism.
 Helsinki, 31 May 2012
 Päivi Räsänen
 Minister of the Interior
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71. Introduction
In its programme of 17 June 2012, Prime Minister Jyrki Katainen’s Government decided on the preparation of the 
third Internal Security Programme. In accordance with the Government Programme, the core content of the Internal 
Security Programme consists of measures to help prevent and resolve key security issues in terms of their infl uence on 
everyday life. The Government Programme requires improved prevention of both violence and violent radicalisation.
On 3 November 2011, mandated by the Government Programme Resolution, the Government set up a project for 
the preparation of the Internal Security Programme. As part of this Resolution, an expert group was appointed to 
draw up a Programme of Measures for the prevention of violent extremism. Such a Programme of Measures will 
be implemented as part of the Internal Security Programme.
For their part, measures determined in the Internal Security Programme will promote the prevention of violent 
extremism. The Programme of Measures to prevent violent extremism will complement the Internal Security 
Programme.
Since 2005, several European countries have prepared programmes to combat violent extremism. At the moment, 
the contents of these programmes are being reviewed to take better account of extreme right and left-wing groups 
that use violence. In Finland, the second Internal Security Programme included some preventive measures against 
violent radicalisation, but this is the fi rst Programme of Measures to comprise extensive measures for the prevention 
of violent extremism. It also covers school killings and similar acts of violence.
The objective of the Programme is to prevent all violence predicated on ideas and ideologies. The Programme of 
Measures to prevent violent extremism will be complemented by the Counterterrorism Strategy mandated by the 
Government in 2010. It will also be updated in accordance with the resolutions of Prime Minister Jyrki Katainen’s 
Government Programme.
Violent extremism does not necessarily lead to terrorism. As a rule, preventive measures are public, and implemented 
by representatives of civic society as well as the authorities. The Counterterrorism Strategy focuses on uncovering 
and preventing terrorist activities. It also ensures that the authorities remain fully functional in the case of a terrorist 
attack. In Finland, the main responsibility for counterterrorism lies with the police. When the nature of the assign-
ment is cast as crime prevention, the prevention of violent extremism becomes counterterrorism under the 
responsibility of the law enforcement authorities.
Extensive measures for improving security have been included in the Internal Security Programme. Some of these 
measures, such as addressing bullying at schools, improving the safety of young people and immigrants, preventing 
serious violence, and improving trust and participation, are also central to the prevention of violent extremism.
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92. Objective of the Action Plan
The Government Programme of 17 June 2011 set out its internal security objective as follows:
The objective of internal security is to make Finland the safest country in Europe, one in which people 
feel that they live in a fair and equal society regardless of how they identify themselves
The Programme of Measures for preventing violent extremism seeks to identify and prevent violent acts aimed 
at promoting extremist ideas or ideologies. Preventing violent extremism is a key part of strengthening our 
democratic system. The Programme of Measures for preventing violent extremism is being implemented 
extensively by the authorities, organisations and communities.  
3. Violent extremism and its prevention
3.1 Violent extremism
No single, clear, internationally accepted defi nition of violent extremism exists. In this Action Plan, extremism 
refers to a radical ideology, doctrine or extreme idea, devoted to fomenting anti-democratic, illegal acts and 
policies aimed at achieving fundamental social change. Extremist violence refers to illegal activities and violence 
motivated by an extremist view of the world that can, at its most extreme, also lead to terrorism.1
Radical ideas in themselves do not constitute extremism. Radicalism can be a positive, developmental and 
socially progressive force. Extremist activities, on the other hand, are in principle totalitarian, anti-democratic, 
extra-parliamentary, and often illegal. Non-violent extremism that refrains from violence is not, in itself, 
objectionable, although in terms of social cohesion extreme thinking arising from intolerance and hate is 
a cause for concern.
 1 Terrorist off ences are described in Chapter 34 a of the Criminal Code of Finland.
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The individual radicalisation process2 may take years or can be very rapid. Extremism is characterised by a 
clear-cut, black-and-white image of the opposition, based on which individual issues and people are viewed 
as representatives of a larger group or unit. Violence springing from extremist ideas can be targeted at ethnic, 
sexual, or religious minorities, specifi c occupational groups, or anyone the extremist considers wrong-thinking 
and thus the enemy. Extremism can motivate acts of vandalism, or threatening or intimidating behaviour, 
which damage society and disrupt its functioning. 
Very few of those who have adopted extremist thinking, and even of those who approve of the use of fear 
and violence, ever attempt serious acts of violence against other people. Still, just one person drifting into 
extremism can lead to extreme, and, in terms of society and its citizens, very serious acts of violence.
Considerable research has been performed on violent extremism and the recruitment process of extreme 
movements. However, researchers have been unable to identify any particular reason for the radicalisation of 
an individual to the point where he or she is willing to use violence against other people. Identifying, preventing, 
counteracting and researching the phenomenon are challenging, since it ultimately concerns an internal change 
within a person.
Possible causes of violent extremism may include issues related to a young person’s development, such as seeking 
an identity and direction in life. Experiences of discrimination, racism, or feelings of exclusion may render a young 
person more vulnerable to extremist messages. When a person begins to act in order to rectify his or her exclusion 
and seeks a new direction in life, he or she becomes receptive to diff erent ideas and infl uences. For a young person 
feeling excluded from society, an extreme movement may be the fi rst community to off er appreciation and status, 
whether in or outside the movement. According to research, social and communal reasons are key factors in seeking 
out such groups; ideological commitments follow after actual membership has been established. Extremism 
off ers a strong, full identity and the social support of a community that thinks alike. Common thinking within 
a group creates a feeling of “we” who are in the right, while the rest of society is in the wrong. Social support 
and group dynamics often play key roles in the radicalisation process. This tight-knit community of people 
who think alike can also be formed in the virtual world.
Radicalisation can be motivated by isolated events that provide the initial spark for extremist thinking, or encourage 
it further. Experiences that create vulnerability to radicalisation are often related to injustice and discrimination. 
Identifying with the suff ering or humiliation of others through the media or Internet may also enhance the 
attraction of extremist messages.
Extremist movements actively recruit new members. Young people in search of an identity, and who feel frustrated 
and vulnerable, can be susceptible to these messages. Extremist movements also target their recruitment activities 
at such youngsters. Radicalisation-motivating topics, such as experiences of injustice and the image of a common 
enemy, are used in the recruitment process. People often join extremist movements through someone they know.
The Internet is increasingly important as a tool for recruitment and spreading extremist propaganda.
 2  In the Action Plan, radicalisation refers to violent, extremist radicalisation.
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3.2 Preventing violent extremism 
Responsibility for preventing violent extremism lies with the whole of society and all authorities who, as part 
of their work, are capable of identifying and preventing the early signs of violent extremism. Preventing violent 
extremism also requires the involvement of civic society. Violent extremism poses a threat to the democratic 
system and the rights established under the constitution, such as being treated equally, the right to life, 
personal freedom and integrity.
Feelings of hatred provide a foundation for extremist thinking. The key to preventing extremist thinking fuelled 
by hatred is trust in a functional democratic system, where every citizen has the opportunity to infl uence issues 
that he or she perceives as important. Social exclusion, lack of prospects, and feelings of marginalisation, all create 
a breeding ground for extremist thinking. Measures implemented extensively within society to prevent social 
exclusion are vital to preventing violent extremism. In particular, measures taken to prevent the social exclusion 
of young people, by reducing the number of school drop-outs, preventing unemployment, and promoting 
successful integration, education and language skills, enhance social cohesion and prevent extremist thinking.
In addition, prevention of violent extremism requires targeted measures which can have an impact on the 
lure of extremist ideologies and ideas, and identify, help and support those at high risk of committing violent 
extremist actions.
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4. Violent extremism in Europe and the 
 Nordic countries
4.1 Violent extremism in EU Member States
Every year, Europol, the European Police Offi  ce, publishes a report on the threat posed by terrorism in the European 
Union.3 In this report, extremist thinking and the terrorism it inspires are divided into fi ve categories: religious, 
separatist, left-wing extremist and anarchist, right-wing extremist, and single-issue terrorism, such as the radical 
animal rights movement.
3 EUROPOL TE-SAT 2012. EU Terrorism Situation and Trend Report. Every year, based on contributions of the Member States, the 
 European law enforcement agency (Europol) collates a situation and trend report describing the current state of terrorism and 
 extremist movements, and the threat they pose. The situation and trend report is collated on the basis of contributions from the 
 EU Member States and third countries, along with Interpol and Eurojust. This so-called TE-SAT Report provides law enforcement 
 authorities, decision makers and the general public with a broad understanding of the status and development of terrorism and 
 extremism in Europe. 
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The EU Member States’ law enforcement authorities quantify the greatest threat facing Europe as terrorism 
inspired by radical Islamic and the al-Qaida ideology, whose objective has generally been large-scale attacks 
claiming several victims. Within the European Union, 122 people were arrested in 2011 for crimes related to radical 
Islamic terrorism. A considerable number of these were either members of a small autonomous extremist group or 
radicalised individuals acting independently. No radical Islamic terrorist attacks were carried out in Europe during 
2011.4 The year before that, there were three such attacks or attempts. Two took place in Denmark and one in 
Sweden. Europol estimates that the threat against the Nordic countries and Germany grew during 2011.
Radical Islamic propaganda instigating violence is actively distributed on the Internet. Propaganda on the Internet 
and discussion forums can have a strong contributory impact on the radicalisation of a vulnerable individual. Such 
material is abundant and easily available in several European languages. Violent messages are specifi cally targeted 
at radicalising and recruiting young Western people. In terms of prevention, it is a cause for concern that propaganda 
is encouraging people to act and strike alone, without the support of a group.
In terms of quantity, separatist extremist thinking springing from nationalism and ethnicity is the largest form of 
extremism behind terrorist attacks within the European Union. In 2011, 110 separatist-motivated terrorist attacks 
and 247 arrests were reported. Separatist extremism and the threat of it mainly concerns France, Spain and Ireland; 
235 such arrests took place in these countries.
Within the European Union, 37 terrorist attacks related to left-wing or anarchic extremism were carried out in 2011. 
The number of attacks was down slightly on 2010, but the number of arrests made was higher than the previous 
year. Most of the 42 people arrested in 2011 belonged, or were suspected of belonging to, an organisation 
categorised as terrorist. The activities of anarchic groups have become more violent and attacks have been 
aimed at government operators. In 2010, left-wing extremist and anarchic terrorism claimed six lives in Greece.
Anarchic groups are most active in Greece, Italy and Spain. Their operations are increasingly international and 
there is mutual solidarity between anarchic groups in diff erent countries. In 2011, several letter bombs were 
sent across Europe. An Italian anarchic group, FAI, claimed responsibility for these attacks, stating that the bombs 
represented a display of solidarity for a Greek group of anarchists. The economic downturn has also increased 
anarchic movements in other Member States of the European Union, but these groups have so far mainly aimed 
to cause fi nancial damage and to gain publicity for their activities. Violence by Northern European anarchic groups 
has traditionally been targeted at right-wing extremist groups and individuals. In recent years, confrontations 
between right-wing extremist and anarchic groups have become more severe and violent.
In 2011, a terrorist attack motivated by right-wing extremism took place within the European Union5, with fi ve 
people being arrested for crimes related to such terrorism.6 According to a Europol estimate, terrorism motivated 
by right-wing politics does not pose a threat to the state structures of European Union Member States. However, 
the activities of such groups may be detrimental to the social cohesion of local communities. Violence by right-wing 
extremists is displayed in statistics as hate crimes against ethnic, religious and sexual minorities. Violence is also 
evident in confrontations with left-wing extremists or anarchists, the so-called anti-fascist groups. Left-wing 
extremist activities are becoming more professional and active in terms of online propaganda.
 4  Two US soldiers were killed in a religiously motivated attack at Frankfurt Airport in March 2011. 
 However, this was not considered a terrorist attack under German legislation.
5 Arson attack in Spain.
6 Arrests were made in Germany and were related to a politically motivated 
 series of murders during 2001–2007.
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The serious terrorist attacks of July 2011 in Norway were not motivated by traditional, National-Socialism-idolising 
right-wing extremism. The perpetrator’s world view has been characterised as an individual and unique mix of 
extreme conservatism, xenophobia, and anti-“Islamisation” of Europe. The events in Norway can nevertheless be 
viewed as refl ecting a certain trend. Right-wing extremist groups in Europe are seeking new supporters by profi ling 
themselves as the opponents of “Islamisation” of the continent. Although these types of groups send a radical 
message based on intolerance, many European countries have decided to treat them as legal civic actors.7
The main responsibility for the prevention of radicalisation in the European Union lies with the Member States. 
Radicalisation is being prevented at national, regional and local level. It is the task of the European Union to 
promote the exchange of information and experiences regarding the prevention of violent extremism between 
Member States. The European Union Strategy for Combating Radicalisation and Recruitment to Terrorism was 
completed in 2005.8 In their preventive strategy, the European Union Member States have committed themselves 
to preventing recruitment to terrorism, and to ensuring that the voices of mainstream opinion prevail over those 
of extremism. Other objectives include promoting security, justice, democracy and equal opportunities for all. 
In 2009, the European Council endorsed a multiannual programme of legislative and internal aff airs for the period 
2010–2014. The so-called Stockholm Programme confi rms the signifi cance of preventing radicalisation, as part 
of counterterrorist eff orts. The European Union’s Internal Security Strategy of 2010 emphasises the importance 
of prevention. In the autumn of 2011, together with the Committee of the Regions, the Commission launched 
the Europe-wide Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN). The purpose of this network is to spread awareness of 
radicalisation and provide information on the production of counter-narratives, alongside communications that 
challenge the terrorists’ narrative. 
7 For instance, the English Defence League, which is permitted and legal, but conveys hard-line, confrontational messages.
8 14781/1/05. The wording of the strategy has since then been revised to no longer stigmatise a specifi c group of people or religion.
4.2 Violent extremism in the Nordic Countries
 4.2.1 Sweden
The Swedish Secret Service (Säpo) has estimated that Sweden has around 200 active individuals motivated by 
violent Islamism.9 In December 2010, a Swedish man with an Iraqi background blew himself up in the centre of 
Stockholm, during the pre-Christmas rush. At worst, the attack could have caused substantial casualties, but his 
two bombs did not explode as expected. The man justifi ed his terrorist act on the basis of the cartoons published 
in Sweden and Denmark and perceived as derogatory, as well as military action being taken in Afghanistan.10 
Organised right-wing extremist groups with National Socialistic ideologies have operated for some time in 
Sweden. Examples of these include Svenskarnas Parti (SvP) and Svenska Motstånsrörelsen (SMR). The two main 
annual events of right-wing extremists – known as the White Power groups in Sweden – the so-called Salem 
March and the National Day parade, are attended by an estimated thousand people. There have been several 
violent clashes between right-wing and left-wing extremists – known as the autonomous movement – at various 
meetings and marches.
In December 2011, Sweden published a programme against violent extremism.11 In accordance with the 
programme title – Action plan to safeguard democracy against violence-promoting extremism – this focuses on 
defending democracy against violent extremist thinking. In preventing extremism, the emphasis is on right-wing 
extremism, left-wing extremism, and violent Islamism. The objective of the programme is to increase awareness 
of democratic values and violent extremist movements. 
9  Violence-promoting Islamist extremism in Sweden. Swedish Security Service 2010.  
10  Annual Report of the Swedish Security Service 2010. 
11  Government Publication 2011/12:44. Action plan to safeguard democracy against violence-promoting extremism.
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 4.2.2 Denmark
Denmark has for long been targeted as an enemy by radical Islamic, violence-instigating propaganda, since 
a Danish newspaper published cartoons that were perceived as derogatory. The authorities in Denmark have 
uncovered several planned attacks on cartoonist Kurt Westergaard and the newspaper that published the cartoons, 
Jyllans Posten. Throughout the 2000s, they have also uncovered plans for terrorist acts, formulated by persons born 
or raised in Denmark.
In Denmark, right or left-wing extremist violence has focused on confrontations between right-wing and so-called 
anti-fascist groups. The Danish Security and Intelligence Service (PET) has estimated that confrontations between the 
two groups will increase and escalate. Left and right-wing extremist propaganda has also actively instigated violence 
against opponents’ marches, concerts and meetings. Both groups have international connections and their activities 
often cross national borders.
The Danish action plan against extremism was published in January 2009.12 This action plan has two main 
objectives. The fi rst is to directly and specifi cally address the reasons and processes leading to a young person’s 
joining an extremist movement. The second objective is to strengthen Danish democracy and root out the 
structural factors underlying extremism. 
12 A common and safe future. Action plan to prevent extremist views and radicalisation among young people.
 4.2.3 Norway
The Norwegian Police Security Service (PST) estimates that radical Islamic groups still pose the greatest extremist 
threat in Norway. According to the PST, a few charismatic leaders are active in promoting radicalisation and praise 
the use of violence as a tool for gaining political power. People have been arrested in Norway for planning terror-
ist activities, for example the arrests made in the summer 2010. According to PST, the threat issues from persons 
who have grown up in Norway, but view the country as their enemy.
The threat from right-wing extremists is still considered fairly minor in Norway, and groups have mainly failed in 
their recruitment eff orts.
At the end of 2010, an action plan to prevent radicalisation and violent extremism was published in Norway.13 The 
action plan evaluates the existence of extremist movements in Norway and the reasons behind them. The action 
plan emphasises trust in the authorities as the key prerequisite for the prevention of extremist operations. It lists 
the responsibilities of and opportunities for the judicial system and police, alongside other sectors, to prevent 
extremism, while highlighting the use of foreign policy tools. 
13 Collective security - a shared responsibility. Action plan to prevent radicalisation and violent extremism.
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5. Violent extremism in Finland
5.1 Threat posed by violent extremism to Finnish Society
In Finland, extremist violence poses no threat to state structures. It can be evaluated as mainly posing a potential 
security risk to individual people and actors. Such a threat may also be targeted at certain foreign interests located 
in our country, such as embassies. However, the possibility of a single, radicalised individual carrying out an act of 
terrorism or violence cannot be ruled out in Finland.
School killings have occurred around the world, the majority of them in the United States. There have been two 
school killings in Finland; one in Jokela in November 2007 and the other in Kauhajoki in September 2008. Mental 
health problems and school bullying can almost always be found in a school killer’s background. The killer’s way of 
thinking has often been found to contain references to rather extreme ideas and misanthropy. School killings and 
similar acts of violence diff er in many ways from the most common types of homicide; their prevention and the 
prevention of violent extremism share common features.
The Muslim community in Finland is heterogenic and mainly moderate. Violent, radical Islamic views are not 
connected with communities in Finland, but are problematic at individual level. There are clear indications of 
attempts made in Finland to support Islamist-motivated terrorist activities in the individuals’ countries of origin, 
or in a confl ict zone.14 It is also suspected that radical Islamic individuals residing in Finland have participated in 
fi ghting carried out by terrorist groups, or in weapons training in crisis zones. People with fi ghting experience 
and combat training can generally be considered more susceptible to committing acts of violence.
Examples from Sweden and Denmark show that the situation can take a crucial turn for the worse as the result of 
a single triggering event. Denmark and Sweden have been targets of Islamist hate propaganda for years, since 
their newspapers published cartoons that were perceived as derogatory. In terms of violent extremism and the 
terrorist threat, it would be a cause for concern if Finland were profi led as a so-called enemy state in international, 
violence-instigating radical Islamic propaganda. This might also radicalise individuals and increase their willingness 
to take violent or even terrorist action.
As Nordic countries become targets of, rather than support regions for, radical Islamic terrorism, Finland may also 
be aff ected. Planning of attacks is often multi-ethnic and international. It is possible that radical Islamists residing 
in Finland will seek to participate in terrorist action in another Nordic country.
The activities of left-wing, anarchic, right-wing, or so-called single-issue extremists are not considered to pose a 
threat to state structures or critical systems in Finland. Left-wing extremist and anarchic movements in Finland 
have been fairly moderate and peaceful compared to other European countries. However, a number of arson 
attacks and other, sabotage-like acts of vandalism were carried out in Finland in 2011, for which anarchists have
14  The fi rst preliminary investigation regarding a terrorist off ence in Finland was launched in September 2011.
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publically claimed responsibility. If anarchic movements are behind these crimes, this would mean actual 
radicalisation of the anarchic movement in Finland and the arrival of the militant operational models seen 
elsewhere in Europe.
Right-wing extremist activity has long been marginal and minor in Finland. However, some activation of local 
skinhead communities has been detected during the year gone by. Racist activism has been detected in regions 
that have received relatively large numbers of immigrants over a short period of time. Right-wing extremist 
violence is mainly manifested in racist-motivated assaults and encounters turning into street violence. The 
activities of Finnish right-wing extremists largely focus on spreading propaganda over the Internet and 
distributing stickers and leafl ets etc. Finnish right-wing extremists also have international connections.
Individuals with hard-line, extremist views pose a security threat to society that is diffi  cult to prepare for. 
Identifi cation of such individual actors is highly challenging, as they do not form part of any extremist group.
5.2 Social factors infl uencing development of violent extremism
In the last decade, the security implications of social exclusion have come to the fore. Social exclusion has been 
defi ned as the greatest threat to internal security in Government Resolutions on internal security programmes 
and in the Government Programme of Jyrki Katainen. Finns’ trust in the authorities and institutions, which is 
exceptionally high by European standards, has helped to prevent extremism. No signifi cant culture of aggressive 
rioting has existed in Finland in recent decades.
On the whole, the level of well-being among young people in Finland is high. However, a small group of young 
people is excluded from society very early on. They account for approximately fi ve per cent of those aged 
between 15 and 29. This means more than 50,000 young people, who are out of work and have not received 
any education since leaving school. Some 32,500 young people form the hard core of the socially excluded. These 
are not registered as unemployed job-seekers and are not included in any statistics. It is worth noting that social 
exclusion is a particular problem for young men. In 2010, two thirds of the young people marginalised from 
society were men.15
Almost a quarter of young people left outside society, and at the core of social exclusion, have an immigrant 
background. Their exclusion is often connected with unsuccessful integration. While the unemployment rate 
among young people in Finland is low compared to many other European countries, such as Spain and Greece, the 
exclusion percentage of young people who do not speak Finnish or Swedish16 is more than fi ve-fold compared to 
those who do. It is signifi cantly harder for a person with an immigrant background to access the Finnish education 
and labour markets than for native Finns. According to the Employment Report for 2011, issued by the Ministry of 
Employment and the Economy, the level of unemployment among immigrants was 2.5 to 3 fold that of the entire 
population. However, there are signifi cant diff erences between groups, in terms of nationality and language. 
Finding employment is most diffi  cult for Afghans, Iraqis and Somalis, who have entered Finland as refugees.
Finnish young people are increasingly prepared to take illegal social action. In 1999, only three per cent of young 
people in Finland indicated preparedness to take illegal action, but in 2009 the fi gure was nine per cent. This 
suggests that young people in Finland are clearly more prepared to take illegal action than in other Nordic coun-
tries. It is worrying that, compared to the rest of Europe, the number of young people with critical attitudes 
15   Hukassa - Keitä ovat syrjäytyneet nuoret? Analysis by the Finnish Business and Policy Forum (Eva), No 19. 1.2.2012. Myrskylä.
16 15-29 year-old with no post-comprehensive education and not studying or working. also approve of the use of violence 
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towards immigrants, and positive attitudes towards illegal activities, has increased in Finland. These young people 
signifi cantly more often than equivalent groups elsewhere in Europe. Attitudes towards equal rights for diff erent 
ethnic groups are also more critical in Finland.17
In 2008, the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights carried out an extensive, Europe-wide survey of 
discrimination experienced by minorities. In this survey, Somalis in Finland stood out in terms of their experiences 
of discrimination and racism. One in three Somalis had encountered racist violence, the threat of violence, or a 
serious threat in the previous year. Encounters of discrimination and racism often go unreported and are thus 
not visible in offi  cial statistics.
Violent extremist movements are infl uenced by other countries. They are also closely connected to their own 
society and problems at local level. Radicalisation of a person or group may be infl uenced by global events 
and problems experienced personally. A society’s ability to resist violent extremist ideas correlates directly to 
the amount of control citizens feel that they have over the issues aff ecting them. The key counterbalance to 
extremism is a functioning democratic system, openness of society, and strong participation.
Social fragmentation and regional segregation are still negligible in Finland compared to many other European 
countries. As yet, there are no housing estates in Finland that are a cause for concern in terms of extremism; 
no groups in which frustration, unemployment, insuffi  cient income, social exclusion, and lack of trust are 
accumulating. Education policy and political choices made within housing development have prevented the 
segregation of population groups and polarisation of society. In terms of the prevention of violent extremism, 
it is vital to retain the factors that strengthen Finnish society’s ability to resist violent extremist movements.
Active non-governmental organisations have been a special characteristic of Finnish society for which the 
Government provides fi nancial support. This has helped to channel activities towards legal organisations that 
make a diff erence through the democratic system. Since the Second World War, decision-making in Finnish 
society has been characterised by the intention to achieve a consensus and avoid confrontation.
Extreme groups operate in the same environment. They infl uence and feed each other. Activation of one 
group may be refl ected in another. In other countries, left-wing or anarchic, anti-fascist movements have been 
activated as a counterbalance to the growing right-wing movement. Then again, the right-wing movement may 
gain popularity when, for example, locally increased immigration is perceived as a threat. Experiences of racism, 
discrimination, and feelings of being marginalised, have been identifi ed as background factors leading to Islamic 
radicalisation. Economic recession, changes in Finnish society and the potential crumbling of the traditional 
consensus-based ideology may worsen the general atmosphere and lead to greater tension in society. 
This may increase the popularity of protest movements with harder-line ideologies.
The challenge lies in preventing international radical and violent operating models from coming ashore in 
Finland. Developments among international actors may radicalise domestic extremist movements. Global, 
and often unpredictable, phenomena such as wars or confl icts or isolated, highly emotive events may trigger 
the radicalisation of an individual or group.
17 Youth Research 1/2012, Suutarinen and Törmäkangas.
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6. Measures to prevent violent extremism
The main responsibility for the prevention of violent extremism lies with states, their central governments, and 
regional and local authorities. Eff ective, preventive action requires extensive collaboration among authorities 
and cooperation with civic society.
The European Union requires that Member States take active measures to prevent violent extremism. It supports 
the activities of Member States by promoting the dissemination of good practices among states and supporting 
other cooperation between them. Member States regularly report their activities for the prevention of violent 
extremism to the European Union.
The objective of this Action Plan is to prevent and combat violent acts justifi ed by extremist ideas and ideologies. 
Approval of the use of violence against other people, in order to further one’s own goals, is common to such extremist 
ideas and ideologies. They also have no respect for human rights and the principles of equality confi rmed in 
international agreements and the constitution, and do not operate according to democratic principles.
People who justify acts of violence through extremist ideas and ideologies may be members of extremist groups, 
or they may operate outside such groups, as so-called lone actors. Such groups may be tightly or loosely organised; 
they may also operate virtually, on the Internet, with members who do not meet physically. In such cases, it can 
be rather diffi  cult to distinguish between a member of a group and a lone actor.
The implementation and eff ect of the measures set out in the Action Plan will be monitored and reported 
on regularly.
6.1 Enhance cooperation to prevent violent extremism 
Eff ective prevention of violent extremism is possible through extensive cooperation between various authorities. 
It also requires collaboration with civic society. Open interaction between operators and the sharing of experiences 
and good practices are vital in preventing violent extremism. That is why it is important that the prevention of 
violent extremism is not subsumed under counterterrorism activities.
Prevention of violent extremism requires cooperation among key authorities. In their basic work, teachers, social 
workers, heath care personnel, and youth workers face situations in which it is possible to identify early signs of 
violent extremist thinking. The police are an important expert on issues related to violent extremism and can 
off er specialist support to other authorities in preventive work.
In terms of preventing violent acts, it is vital that such early signs are addressed. In any given situation, an individual 
authority may fi nd it diffi  cult to take action alone. This is why networking is required, in order to provide a forum 
in which various professionals can discuss the situation and the most suitable methods for dealing with it. 
A permanent cooperation team enables the development of multiprofessional expertise in the prevention 
of violent extremism.
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In terms of preventing violent extremism, local cooperation is supported by national cooperation with 
representatives of key authorities. The national cooperation network monitors the status and development 
of violent extremism both in Finland and internationally, and takes any action necessary to enhancing 
preventative measures. In the prevention of violent extremism, the national cooperation team engages 
in extensive cooperation with civic society.
Measures:
1. Establish local inter-authority cooperation for the prevention of violent extremism, by forming a
 cooperation network linked to the preventive activities of the police and represented by relevant 
 key authorities. The pilot unit for such cooperation will be the Helsinki Police Department and 
 cooperation teams will be established in Oulu, Tampere and Turku.
Local cooperation teams will monitor violent-extremism-related phenomena and their development 
in the area, and prepare the necessary measures to address any detected phenomena. These teams 
will distribute information and expertise on violent extremism to other authorities and interest groups. 
In order to prevent violent extremism, they will collaborate with the representatives of civic society 
that are relevant to each issue. 
Implementation: 
 Launch of cooperation teams in 2012, after which the teams will become permanent. 
Responsibility: 
 The National Cooperation Network of Violent Extremism, the National Police Board together with 
 local authorities.
2. The National Cooperation Network for the Prevention of Violent Extremism will be established and will 
 comprise all of the relevant authorities. The tasks of the cooperation network include monitoring the 
 status of violent extremism in Finland and internationally, providing information on such developments 
 to various authorities and local cooperation teams, drawing up initiatives to enhance prevention  
 operations, and organising seminars and other training related to the issue. The national cooperation 
 network will promote cooperation with civic society in order to prevent violent extremism. Every year, 
 the national cooperation network will publish a progress report, including information on the 
 activities and results of local cooperation teams.
Implementation: 
 Launch of the cooperation network in 2012, after which the operations will become permanent.  
Responsibility: 
 Ministry of the Interior, together with various authorities. 
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6.2 Strengthen trust in the democratic system and use it to make 
 a diff erence
Trust in the democratic system and the genuine opportunities it off ers to eff ect changes, both nationally and 
locally, is the most important general prerequisite for preventing violent extremist ideas and ideologies from 
gaining support among citizens. The general prerequisites for civic activity are promoted by the Unit for Democracy, 
Language Aff airs and Fundamental Rights at the Ministry of Justice. A democratic system that works both locally 
and nationally provides citizens with the opportunity to aff ect decisions that they consider important.
 6.2.1 Strengthen young people’s trust in the democratic system and use it to make 
 a diff erence
It is especially important to ensure that young people regard the democratic system as an eff ective way of infl uencing 
their own environment and the broad development of society. In recent decades, there has been little discussion 
within Finnish society of the democratic system and its signifi cance to society and citizens’ welfare. Discussion 
of politics and politicians has often been negative and belittling. This may be a factor adding to the negative or 
indiff erent attitude young people exhibit towards the democratic system and using it to make a diff erence. 
Presenting the democratic system primarily through the related shortcomings may eventually enhance the 
attraction of groups that base their activities on what are frequently very black-and-white ideas. They off er clear, 
simple and eff ective solutions to issues that are often perceived as complex.
Finnish young people are increasingly prepared to take illegal social action.18 This does not, as such, mean being 
prepared to use violence in order to achieve goals. It can, however, create a breeding ground that may increase the 
lure of violent extremist groups and ideologies, and can lead to the acceptance of violence at individual level. 
Measures:
3. Strengthen young people’s trust in the democratic system by initiating a democracy-focused dialogue 
 among and with young people, as part of the activities of youth councils, for example. Use these 
 discussions to address democracy-related issues that are important to young people. Engage in 
 dialogues with youth councils, along with municipal and city councils. Regional Advisory Boards for 
 Ethnic Relations (ETNO’s) will also implement democracy discussions, taking into consideration 
 specifi c issues related to young people with an immigrant background. These discussions will be 
 collated into a publication communicating the views of young people collectively.
Implementation: 
 2012–2013. 
Responsibility: 
 Ministry of Education and Culture, Ministry of the Interior, municipal youth services, Finnish Youth 
 Research Network, youth councils, Advisory Board for Ethnic Relations. 
 18 Youth Research 1/2012, Suutarinen and Törmäkangas.
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4. In its activities, the Unit for Democracy, Language Aff airs and Fundamental Rights at the Ministry of 
 Justice will pay attention to strengthening democracy and participation, especially among young 
 people at higher risk of being targeted by anti-democratic messages and messages fomenting 
 violent extremism.
Implementation: 
 2012–2015. 
Responsibility: 
 Ministry of Justice/Unit for Democracy, Language Aff airs and Fundamental Rights. 
 6.2.2 Select a Young Democracy Ambassador every year 
Discussion of democracy and the related issues among young people would be eff ectively enhanced by a person 
who is also young, and thus in touch with young persons’ world and way of thinking, and who can speak their 
language in their own forums. This is why it would be important to select a Young Democracy Ambassador every 
year, to actively promote discussions of democracy with and among young people. The term of ‘Ambassador’ 
would be fi xed to enable diff erent young people to take their turn in introducing various aspects of democracy-
related issues.
Measures:
5. Select a Young Democracy Ambassador every year. The Ambassador’s task will be to participate in the 
 discussion of democracy and introduce themes that are important to young people. He or she will be 
 active on the Internet and in social media, and will be present where young people discuss the social 
 issues they consider important. The Ambassador will be selected in collaboration with key youth 
 organisations.
Implementation: 
 The fi rst Ambassador’s term will begin at the beginning of 2013.  
Responsibility: 
 Ministry of Education and Culture in collaboration with Ministry of Justice/Unit for Democracy, 
 Language Aff airs and Fundamental Rights, alongside youth organisations. 
6.3 Create an operating model for the prevention of violent extremism, 
 for situations requiring rapid action
A very small group of people have powerful violence-related fantasies that involve, for example, imagining 
serious acts of violence against other people. Although the number of these individuals is small, in extreme 
cases they may cause massive damage to their surroundings. The challenge is to identify individuals that can 
fairly be assessed as being at high risk of fantasies leading to acts of violence in practice.
After the school killings, extensive measures have been implemented to prevent their recurrence. Such measures 
include the reform of Finnish fi rearms legislation, the development of mental health and other health services, 
the development of pupil welfare, improving safety and preparedness for action in crisis and disruption situations 
at schools, and extensive safety-related training for people working in educational institutions. In conjunction 
with the second phase of the fi rearms legislation renewal project launched by the Ministry of the Interior, an 
assessment of requirements will be carried out regarding the regulation of storage of fi rearms, the permissibility 
of various types of fi rearms, and other safety aspects. The project will run until 31 December 2013.
Persons infl icting serious fear of violence in others will be reported to the police. The police can hold a person 
for 12 or 24 hours. After this, the person will be released if no other issues come to light. In terms of safeguarding 
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the security, life and health of people, it would be important, in the most serious cases, to create a procedure that 
provides the police with access to a consultation by a psychiatrist or other mental health specialist, to support the 
assessment of the threat involved. Such an assessment would enable the police to form a better idea of the threat 
of violence posed by the person. Similarly, a threatening person could receive a speedy referral for further treat-
ment within the health care services, for example. 
Measures:
6. To the threat assessment tool being prepared by the police, add an operating model that provides 
 the police with access to an assessment by a mental health specialist, of the actual threat represented 
 by, and potential for violence of, a person. In such cases, the police will prepare a threat assessment of 
 the person, using the threat assessment tool. If required, the police could request the assistance and 
 consultation of a psychiatrist or other specialist in drawing up the threat assessment. The assessment 
 would not constitute a patient-doctor relationship, which would prevent use of the information in the 
 planning of further action. Based on the assessment, the person could, if required, be referred quickly 
 for further treatment within the health care services, for example. This procedure will begin through 
 piloting. 
Implementation: 
 Pilot 2012–2013, permanent operation after that.  
Responsibility: 
 The National Police Board, in collaboration with the Ministry of Social Aff airs and Health. 
7. It will not be necessary to refer a person for further treatment from the health care services in all 
 cases, but he or she will require support in processing and relinquishing his or her violent fantasies. 
 Organisations can off er help for those suff ering from violence-related problems. However, the related 
 services are fairly scarce in terms of quantity, and geographically. Organisations’ opportunities to off er 
 mentoring and other low-threshold services, to people suff ering from serious violence-related 
 fantasies and other serious violence-related problems, will be promoted. Such services will be 
 voluntary in nature. Together, the authorities and organisations will devise a referral procedure 
 for accessing these services. 
Implementation: 
 Begin based on existing operating models, from 2012 onwards.  
Responsibility: 
 Ministry of the Interior, Ministry of Social Aff airs and Health, organisations.
 
6.4 Develop communications on issues and situations related to violent 
 extremism and hate speech
The Internet is a key channel in the dissemination of violent-extremism-instigating propaganda and hate speech. 
Propaganda spread on the Internet is professionally produced, emotive and persuasive. It is available in a number 
of languages and is carefully targeted. In addition to propaganda, the Internet contains plenty of messages 
and discussions that damage good ethnic relations and can create a breeding ground for 
violent extremism. It is important to challenge hate speech and propaganda in 
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the environment where such discussions take place. It is also important to bring wider perspectives and diverse 
communication into discussions, to balance the claims made in propaganda and hate speech.
The signifi cance of cooperation between the media and the authorities is highlighted in diffi  cult communication 
situations. After the school killings, it became evident that the signifi cance of communication must be assessed 
from the point of view of the victims and their families and friends, as well as the perpetrator. Ill-considered 
communication can increase the suff ering of the victims of violence and their families.
In terms of offi  cial communication, the correct timing is important, along with the content. With respect to 
the Internet and social media, offi  cial communication is even more challenging. The authorities no longer 
hold exclusive rights to communication in situations involving a serious threat, since information and pictures 
spread immediately through the social media. For this reason, it is important that the authorities are prepared 
to communicate quickly and professionally in situations that, if prolonged and allowed to intensify, may spur 
the activities of groups that support violent extremism. 
Measures:
8. The National Cooperation Network for the Prevention of Violent Extremism will hold regular 
 cooperation meetings with the media. Current themes related to the prevention of extremism 
 will be discussed at these meetings, from a communicative perspective. 
Implementation: 
 Regularly from 2012 onwards.  
Responsibility: 
 The National Cooperation Network for the Prevention of Violent Extremism in cooperation with 
 persons responsible for communication within the ministries. 
9. The police will strengthen Internet policing, particularly among young people, through measures 
 described in the Internal Security Programme. These operations will be complemented by an 
 operating model that will enable Internet police offi  cers to react to discussions on the Internet that 
 spread messages instigating extremism and violence. Prevention of extremism will also be considered 
 in the strategy for Internet youth work.  
Implementation: 
 Preparation of the operating model and implementation of the operation in 2012, after which the 
 operation will be permanent.  
Responsibility: 
 The National Police Board, police departments. 
6.5 Increase situational awareness and knowhow about violent extremism 
 and its prevention
 
In Finland, there is little awareness of phenomenon of violent extremism. The issue was last publicly discussed in 
the 1990s, in connection with the so-called skinhead problem. In other Nordic countries, and more extensively 
within the European Union, all forms of violent extremism and the related problems have been in the public eye 
for decades.
The prevention and identifi cation of violent extremism require current information on the phenomenon and its 
occurrence in Finland. Regular situation assessments are the fi rst step in the appropriate allocation of measures. 
Based on the situation assessment, national and local cooperation teams are able to plan their activities.
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Sharing experiences and preventative practices with respect to violent extremism increases the eff ectiveness 
of the related activities and promotes rational resource allocation. Practical knowledge about the eff ective 
prevention of violent extremism is continuously accumulating. 
Measures:
10. Every six months, the Finnish Security Intelligence Service will prepare a situation overview on 
 violent extremism for the National Cooperation Network for the Prevention of Violent Extremism. 
 This overview will describe the phenomenon, without containing details on individual people 
 or incidents. The contents of the situation overview will be planned in collaboration with the 
 cooperation network and will be taken into consideration when planning the operations of 
 the National Cooperation Network for the Prevention of Violent Extremism. 
Implementation: 
 1. overview in 2012, regular overviews biannually thereafter.  
Responsibility: 
 The Finnish Security Intelligence Service, in cooperation with the National Network for the 
 Prevention of Violent Extremism. 
11. Good practices and other material supporting practical work in preventing violent extremism will 
 be collated into an electronic “toolbox”, which will then be regularly updated. 
Implementation: 
 Completion in 2013. 
Responsibility: 
 The Ministry of the Interior will set up a cross-administrative working group for the preparation 
 and maintenance of the material. 
6.6 Supplementing the Action Plan
As a phenomenon, violent extremism is unpredictable and adaptable, as shown by recent developments. It is 
important that the implementation of the Action Plan be treated as a process, accommodating the relevant 
developments and good practices established along the way. In order to be eff ective, preventive measures must 
respond to the current situation and estimated future developments. In this way, the Action Plan will avoid 
trying to prevent the threats of yesterday. Practical work will provide additional, experiential information, based 
on which preventive measures can be revised and improved.
Measures: 
12. Every year, the National Cooperation Network for the Prevention of Violent Extremism will produce 
 a report on its activities and results. An overview of the activities of local networks will be appended 
 to the report, along with an estimate of future developments, and action recommended for enhancing 
 prevention work. 
Implementation: 
 Annual reporting.  
Responsibility: 
 National Network for the Prevention of Violent Extremism. 
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7. Implementation, monitoring and 
 reporting of the Action Plan
The Action Plan to Prevent Violent Extremism will be implemented as part of the Government Resolution regarding 
the Programme of Internal Security. Ministries and their administrative branches will make implementation of 
the measures included in the Action Plan part of their performance management and will incorporate it in their 
operational and fi nancial planning.
Regional implementation of the Action Plan will be ensured in the implementation plans of the Programme of 
Internal Security.
Implementation of the Action Plan will be reported annually in accordance with measure 12. This report will 
be prepared by the National Cooperation Network for the Prevention of Violent Extremism. It will include an 
overview of regional and local activities. The report will examine the implementation status of the measures 
agreed in the Action Plan, present the development of key fi gures used in monitoring, and evaluate the results 
achieved and recommended supplementary actions.
7.1 Key fi gures used in monitoring
Monitoring of the Action Plan will use key fi gures to monitor the current situation and the achieved results, 
along with evaluating the measures recommended for the enhancement of prevention work. The key fi gures 
are divided into four entities to be monitored: background factors aff ecting violent extremism, racism and 
discrimination, participation, the Internet and communication, and cooperation and the dissemination of 
good practices.
Background Factors Aff ecting Violent Extremism
Racism and Discrimination
Social Participation
The Internet and Communication
Key fi gure, source
Key fi gure, source
Key fi gure, source
Key fi gure, source
Level of school drop-outs (%)
- young people not in post-comprehensive education 
- secondary education drop-outs (upper secondary school and 
 vocational education)
2012
2012
2012
2012
Statistics Finland
National Victimisation 
Survey
Estimates based on 
reports published
annually
Police
Source
Source
Source
Source
8,9 %19
Upper secondary school  4 % and 
vocational education  9,1 %20
60,801 people23
4,689 people
14 cases24
177 cases
538 cases
424,000 people25
approx.13226
1-2?
246 kpl
2,000 people22
20,1 %21
KELA
Hate crimes reported 
to the police
in Finland, Police 
College
National Sports
Survey
Ministry of Education 
and Culture
The Cooperation Network 
for the Prevention 
of  Violent Extremism
Ministry of Employment and the 
Economy, Annual Employment 
Service Statistics
Statistics Finland,
Labour Force Survey
Number of young people aged 16–24 receiving a disability pension 
due to mental and behavioural problems
Number of racists crimes reported to the police (main crimes):
1. ethnic agitation
2. defamation
3. assaults
Number of children and young people participating in activities 
of sports associations
Number of NGOs involved in youth work applying for 
government subsidies
Number of meetings with the media
Number of young people under 25 who have been continuously 
unemployed for over a year
Youth unemployment rate, ages 15–24 (%)
Number of minors aged 15–17 suspected of crimes
- all young people suspected of crimes
- young people suspected of second or more crimes
National Victimisation Survey
Social participation of young people  
Number of contacts made to the Internet Police that 
lead to action
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19 year 2010, 20 year 2009-2010, 21 average for year 2011, 22 year 2011, 23 year 2011, 24 year 2010, 25 year 2009-2010, 26 year 2012
Statistics of the Helsinki 
Virtual Community Police
Preparation of the Action Plan 
The task of the expert group was to draw up a Action Plan to prevent violent extremism, with extensive consideration given 
to extremism motivated by extreme ideas and the use of violence, as well as other serious violence. 
The Government set up an expert group on 3 November 2011. The group was chaired by Tarja Mankkinen, Director, 
Internal Security Secretariat. Other members of the expert group: 
Programme Director  Mika Aaltola  Finnish Institute of International Aff airs
Senior Planning Offi  cer  Mikko Cortés Téllez  Ministry of Education and Culture
Detective Chief Inspector  Heidi Kankainen  Ministry of the Interior
Senior Inspector  Peter Kariuki  Advisory Board for Ethnic Relations ETNO
Senior Customs Inspector  Mika Pitkänen  Finnish Customs
Immigration Director  Sirkku Päivärinne  Ministry of the Interior
Senior Specialist  Tiina Raijas  Ministry of Defence
Major   Urpo Riissanen  Ministry of the Interior 
  [substituted by Lieutenant Colonel Juha Martiskainen]
Superintendent  Seppo Ruotsalainen  National Police Board
Counsellor  Kari Veijalainen  Ministry for Foreign Aff airs
Researcher  Tiina Piipponen  Finnish Security Intelligence Service, Secretary
(The Association of Finnish Local and Regional Authorities was also invited to send presentation)
The expert group met eight times during its term. One additional working meeting was also held. In its meetings, the expert group 
discussed international and national strategies, programmes and decisions to be considered in the preparation of the Action Plan. 
The expert group drew up an assessment of the current state of violent extremism and the key security challenges related to it, along 
with proposals for measures to solve these challenges and to prevent problems from arising. The expert group also proposed key 
fi gures for monitoring the implementation of the Action Plan.
During its term, the group heard the following experts:
Researcher  Leena Malkki  University of Helsinki 
Senior Inspector  Minna Nevala  Ministry of the Interior, Police Department
Docent  Vesa Puuronen  University of Eastern Finland
Project Coordinator  Said Aden  Ministry of Employment and the Economy
Manager  Olavi Sydänmaanlakka  HelsinkiMissio
Detective Chief Inspector  Sami Lipponen  National Bureau of Investigation
Immigrant organisations
The expert group made an excursion to Denmark on 18 – 19 January 2012. The group learnt about practical, local-level work carried out 
in Denmark to prevent violent extremism. The expert group held an extended brainstorming meeting at Humaljärvi on 26 January 2012. 
Outside experts present at this meeting were Vesa Puronen, Docent; Said Aden, Project Coordinator; Olavi Sydänmaanlakka, Manager; 
and Sami Lipponen, Detective Chief Inspector.
The Internal Security Programme steering group outlined the work of the expert group in its meetings on 14 December 2011 
and 12 March 2012. 
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